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The Structure, coherence and limits of inchoate 
liability: the new ulterior element 
 
The wrongs targeted by the criminal law need not reside in a defendant’s conduct and its 
effects (actus reus) or even in her willingness to allow or risk that conduct and its effects 
(mens rea as to actus reus). Rather, to a greater or lesser extent, wrongs may also reside in a 
species of mens rea that does not relate to the actus reus of an offence at all, but is rather 
ulterior to (goes beyond) it. Offences requiring such ulterior mens rea are numerous and 
varied,
1
 ranging from the ‘intention of permanently depriving’ in theft,2 or the role of 
improper intentions in bribery,
3
 through to requirements (such as those within the general 
inchoate offences) that D should act with the ambition of bringing about a full principal 
offence. The use of ulterior mens rea thereby provides unique opportunities for framing 
offences that are able to take account of D’s wrongful state of mind where it has not yet (or 
not yet fully) been actioned externally. In this manner, ulterior mens rea enables the creation 
of offences designed for early intervention within a criminal enterprise and, even where D’s 
actions are complete or have already caused some lesser harm, more accurate labelling and 
punishment that takes account of D’s more seriously wrongful state of mind. As a result, the 
                                                 
1
 For an overview of such offences, see, Horder, ‘Crimes of ulterior intent’ in Simester and Smith (eds), Harm 
and Culpability (CP, 1996), 153.   
2
 Theft Act 1968, s1.  
3
 Bribery Act 2010, ss1-2. For offences under these sections, it is not necessary to show that D induced P to 
perform her duty improperly, or conversely under section 2, that D induced an advantage from P in exchange for 
her offer to act improperly. Rather, it is enough that this was her intention.    
2 
 
creation of new offences which employ ulterior mens rea (often as the foundation of the 
wrong being criminalised) has increased significantly.
4
    
 
This increase is a matter of great importance, carrying with it and reenergising a number of 
seminal debates about the legitimacy of punishing intended (as opposed to completed) 
harms.
5
 However, our aim in this paper is not to restate such debates. Rather, we aim to shed 
light on emerging concerns relating to the application of these offences in practice. This 
secondary issue of application, although often overshadowed by more fundamental debates, 
is no less important. Indeed, with various forms of ulterior mens rea now firmly established 
and expanding within the criminal law, it is contended that such application concerns are long 
overdue specific attention.    
 
At the heart of these concerns is a relatively unusual area of uncertainty: the conceptual 
location of ulterior mens rea within the structure of an offence. By structure, we mean the 
potential separation of an offence into actus reus and mens rea, as well as element analysis 
divisions between acts,
6
 circumstances
7
 and results.
8
 
                                                 
4
 See, for example, recent fraud and terrorism offences. Leader-Elliott, ‘Benthamite reflections on codification 
of the general principles of criminal liability: Towards the panopticon’ (2005) 9 BCLR, 391, 429, remakes upon 
the ‘epidemic spread of offences that take the form of a prohibition of possession of a thing with intent to 
commit an offence.’  
5
 See, Child and Hunt, ‘Risk, pre-emption, and the limits of the criminal law’ in Child, Doolin, Beech and Rain, 
Whose Criminal Justice? Regulatory State or Empowered Communities (Waterside, 2011) 51; McSherry, 
‘Expanding the boundaries of inchoate crimes: The growing reliance on preparatory offences’ in McSherry et al 
(eds) Regulating Deviance – The redirection of criminalisation and the futures of criminal law (Hart, 2009) 141; 
Horder, n1.  
6
 The act element represents the physical conduct of D necessary for the offence, e.g. the movement of D’s 
body. The separation of the act element into actus reus and mens rea represents a controversial decision. 
However, as the acceptance of this choice is not directly relevant to the issue at hand, it will not be explored 
further in this paper. 
7
 The circumstance element represents surrounding facts that are necessary for the offence, e.g. that property 
appropriated in theft should ‘belong to another’.   
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Whereas most offence requirements can be (relatively) consistently categorised and analysed 
within these elements, ulterior mens rea appears to defy such groupings entirely. Thus, where 
element analysis has been employed, the result has been a series of strained attempts to 
present ulterior mens rea as a corollary of existing elements, or simply, as with the general 
part of both the US Model Penal Code
9
 and the 1989 Draft Criminal Code for England and 
Wales,
10
 to avoid any definition or conceptual engagement at all.
11
 Such responses have 
always been unwelcome on a conceptual level and a source of confusion. However, because 
of recent changes in relation to the general inchoate offences, this conceptual problem is now 
also capable of distorting the substantive application of the law.  
 
The position has changed because attempts and assisting and encouraging no longer simply 
require intention as to every part of the principal offence (the offence attempted or assisted or 
encouraged).
12
 Rather, the mens rea required of D in relation to the principal offence is 
                                                                                                                                                        
8
 The result element represents those things that have been caused by D’s acts that are necessary for the offence, 
e.g. ‘death’ in murder.  
9
 US Model Penal Code 1962 (hereafter US MPC). See, Leader-Elliott, n4. 
10
 Law Commission, A Criminal Code for England and Wales (2 vols) (Law Com No.177, 1989). 
11
 The exception to this, discussed in Part 1, is the recent Irish Draft Criminal Code. Criminal Law Codification 
Advisory Committee, Draft Criminal Code and Commentary (DC/04, 2010).  
12
 Similar recommendations have been made for conspiracy, complicity and the intoxication rules: Law 
Commission, Conspiracy and Attempts (Law Com No.318, 2009); Law Commission, Participating in Crime 
(Law Com No.305, 2007) and Law Commission, Intoxication and Criminal Liability (Law Com No.314, 2009). 
For discussion of the later, see Child, ‘Drink, drugs and law reform: A review of Law Commission Report 
No.314’ (2009) CrimLR, 488.   
 Actus Reus Mens Rea 
Acts Element 1 Element 4 
Circumstances Element 2 Element 5 
Results Element 3 Element 6 
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specified separately and distinctly in relation to the elements of that offence (Elements 1-6).
13
 
For example, criminal attempt has been interpreted to require intention as to the act and result 
elements of a principal offence (Elements 1 and 3), but potentially a lesser form of mens rea – 
reflecting that for principal liability – as to circumstances (Element 2). Therefore, in order to 
apply such inchoate offences in practice, it is now essential for the principal offence to be 
dismantled within the element analysis structure. It is only when we have separated the 
requirements of the principal offence into the boxed elements that we are then able to identify 
what mens rea is required of D (for the inchoate offence) in relation to them.  
 
Substantive concerns emerge where an inchoate offence of attempt or assisting or 
encouraging is applied to a principal offence that contains a requirement of ulterior mens rea. 
In order to reveal what mens rea is required of D (for inchoate liability) in relation to the 
principal offence’s ulterior requirement, we must first locate that requirement within one of 
the boxed elements. However, as highlighted above, there are conceptual problems with 
locating this requirement within any current element (Elements 1-6). This issue first arose in 
the troublesome case of AG’s Reference (No.3 of 1992).14 This case involved an offence of 
attempted aggravated arson
15
 where D intended to cause damage to V’s car by fire, but was 
merely reckless as to the potential endangerment of life. As D was merely reckless as to the 
element of endangerment (the ulterior requirement), it therefore became necessary to decide 
whether this element of the principal offence was a conduct or result element (in which case 
intention would be required for attempt liability), or whether it was a circumstance element 
(in which case recklessness would suffice). The problems experienced by the court, and 
                                                 
13
 It is important to recognise that, in the context of these general inchoate offences, we are discussing the 
separation of elements within the principal offence (the offence attempted, assisted, encouraged or conspired). 
The separation of the D’s conduct into elements (e.g. that D went beyond mere preparation or assisted, 
encouraged or agreed) is not currently at issue.  
14
 [1994] 1 WLR 409. 
15
 Criminal Damage Act 1971, s1(2).  
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surrounding commentaries, represent the first area of substantive concern explored in this 
paper. 
 
The case also reveals a second substantive concern. This relates to the preference of the court 
and commentators in trying to fit ulterior requirements within existing elements (Elements 1-
6). It is contended that, even if we adopted an approach that could accommodate ulterior 
mens rea within existing elements, this would be a mistake. This is because, just as current 
reforms of inchoate liability have set mens rea requirements separately for the conceptually 
distinct elements of act, circumstance and result, so the distinct element of ulterior mens rea 
requires similar consideration. However, if ulterior mens rea must be located within current 
offence elements, so as to merge the ulterior requirement with other elements of the principal 
offence, the possibility of distinct treatment is closed off. 
 
Over three parts this paper attempts to clarify these issues, as well as to offer a potential 
solution. Part 1 begins with a discussion of the conceptual problem, exploring and evaluating 
several approaches that have attempted to accommodate ulterior mens rea within existing 
offence elements (Elements 1-6). In Part 2, we then re-evaluate these approaches in the 
context of inchoate liability where our focus shifts to the separation of the elements of a 
principal offence (for example, an offence attempted or encouraged) and the emerging 
substantive concerns outlined above. In each case we maintain that the approach of forcing 
ulterior requirements within existing elements is flawed, and that the appropriate way 
forward would be to adopt a new offence element isolated to ulterior mens rea. Finally, in 
Part 3, we consider the implications of the new recommended offence element. In the context 
of inchoate liability, we ask the normative question: what mens rea should be required of D 
6 
 
as to the new ulterior mens rea element of a principal offence? Offering a tentative response, 
we highlight the potential role of the new element to better control the reach of inchoate 
liability, particularly in the context of infinite inchoate liability.   
 
Illustrated below is the current structure of element analysis with the addition of the 
recommended ulterior mens rea element (Element 7).       
 
 
Preliminary issue: From ulterior intention to ulterior mens rea 
 
Before exploring current approaches to ulterior mens rea, it is necessary to reflect upon a 
common feature that has contributed to the problems outlined above. This is the continued 
insistence, common within textbooks and other academic writing, that discussion of ulterior 
mens rea should be confined to ulterior intention alone.
16
 
 
                                                 
16
 See, Ormerod, Smith and Hogan’s Criminal law (13th Ed, OUP, 2011) 136; Simester, Sullivan, Spencer and 
Virgo, Simester and Sullivan’s Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine (4th Ed, Hart, 2010) 138; Horder, n1.  
 Actus Reus Mens Rea 
Acts Element 1 Element 4 
Circumstances Element 2 Element 5 
Results Element 3 Element 6 
Ulterior Mens Rea  Element 7 
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The ulterior element proposed in this paper extends to all ulterior mens rea. This broadening, 
it is contended, is essential in the context of the current law. Accepting nothing less than 
ulterior intention may be justified on normative grounds, by a belief that if the law is to 
punish unrealised thoughts then this should only be available in relation to what D is 
intending to bring about. Indeed, many offences, such as theft and bribery, do require 
intention. However, whatever one thinks of this normative position, it is clearly not 
descriptive of the current law. This is because several other offences require alternative levels 
of mens rea, most commonly (but not exclusively) recklessness. Examples include 
aggravated criminal damage, where D destroys or damages property ‘reckless as to whether 
the life of another would be thereby endangered’,17 and even the general inchoate offences, 
where a requirement of recklessness as to aspects of the principal offence has become 
increasingly common.
18
  
 
As with ulterior intention, these lesser mens rea requirements relate to external conduct or 
facts that do not have to be realised to establish liability (they are ulterior to the actus reus of 
the offence). If it is the ulterior status that makes ulterior intention distinct from other classes 
of mens rea, it is logical to view these other forms of ulterior mens rea as part of that same 
distinct class. This will be assumed within our ulterior mens rea element.   
 
Part 1: The conceptual problem 
 
                                                 
17
 Criminal Damage Act 1971, s1(2).  
18
 For example, the new assisting and encouraging crime offences. See, Child, ‘Exploring the Mens Rea 
Requirements of the Serious Crime Act 2007 Assisting and Encouraging Offences’ (2012) JCL, 220.  
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To understand the substantive concerns that will be discussed in Parts 2 and 3, in relation to 
general inchoate liability, it is first necessary to understand an underlying conceptual problem 
apparent within all offences that include an ulterior mens rea requirement.  
 
This conceptual problem relates to the placement of ulterior mens rea within current offence 
structures, within actus reus and mens rea, and also within the element analysis structure of 
acts, circumstances and results (Elements 1-6).
19
 As ulterior mens rea operates in the mind of 
D as opposed to the external world, it should not standardly be identified as an actus reus 
element (Elements 1-3). This would imply, as is usually assumed, that it is a species of mens 
rea.
20
 However, when analysing the mens rea of an offence, the corresponding role of actus 
reus remains central. This is because mens rea requires a subject: for example, we cannot 
intend in abstract, intention requires the context of a fact or event that is intended. This 
subject is provided by the actus reus elements, and is reflected in the element analysis 
structure. Thus, to come within one of the traditional mens rea elements (Elements 4-6), the 
mens rea requirement will correspond to an act, circumstance or result element of the actus 
reus.
21
 However, as ulterior mens rea by definition can never correspond to an element of the 
actus reus, the traditional mens rea categories seem equally ill-suited to accommodate it. For 
example, the ulterior mens rea requirement within theft is that D must act with the ‘intention 
of permanently depriving’. If the actus reus of theft required a permanent deprivation, then 
this would be a result element of the crime (Element 3) and the intention would attach to it as 
the mens rea of that result (Element 6). However, as there is no requirement (actus reus) of 
                                                 
19
 Element analysis does not presume that every offence should include all six elements (eg, where conduct 
crimes will not include results). However, in order to operate as a consistent and universal tool, it must be 
possible for all offence requirements to be classifiable within an appropriate element. 
20
 This is how ulterior intention is commonly presented in textbooks. See, Ormerod, n16, 136. 
21
 This approach is reflected in codifications of mens rea terminology. United States (§ 2.02. US MPC); 
Australia (Div.5, Aus Commonwealth Criminal Code (1992)); New Zealand (Cl.21-24, Crimes Bill (1989)); 
England and Wales (Cl.18, Draft Criminal Code Bill (1989)). 
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permanent deprivation, the corresponding mens rea requirement loses its subject within the 
actus reus, becomes ulterior, and it seems cannot be accommodated within the structure.  
 
Ulterior mens rea as part of the actus reus 
 
The idea of locating ulterior mens rea – as a state of mind anticipating a specific fact or event 
– within actus reus elements seems singularly inappropriate. However, just prior to AG Ref 
(No.3 of 1992), Sullivan contended in the context of indecent assault (now sexual assault
22
) 
that ulterior mens rea could be analysed as a circumstance element (Element 2).
23
 For sexual 
assault, the ulterior mens rea requirement relates to the ‘sexual’ dimension of the offence: D’s 
conduct must either be ‘by its nature’ sexual (clear on the actus reus alone), or be potentially 
sexual, and made sexual by circumstances or the purpose of D.
24
 Thus, where D acts with the 
purpose of gaining sexual gratification she satisfies the sexual dimension even where no 
overtly sexual act or actual gratification can be demonstrated, even where her purpose is 
ulterior to events within the actus reus. However, for Sullivan, the lack of corresponding 
actus reus is not a reason to view D’s sexual purpose as ulterior at all. Rather, as D’s purpose 
acts to satisfy the sexual dimension of the offence, a dimension that is usually considered as a 
circumstance element within the actus reus, Sullivan contends that D’s purpose should be 
located similarly: D’s ‘reasons for acting are more than mental accompaniments to conduct 
and are a constituent element of the conduct itself.’25 
 
                                                 
22
 The Sexual Offences Act 2003, s3.  
23
 Sullivan, ‘Bad thoughts and bad acts’ (1990) CrimLR, 559.  
24
 The Sexual Offences Act 2003, s78 (my emphasis).  
25
 Sullivan, n23, 559.  
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Unlike the alternative approaches discussed below, Sullivan is not attempting to create or 
maintain a conceptual model. Rather, his analysis is useful to demonstrate the lack of 
conceptual consensus in this area. For Sullivan, as ulterior mens rea did not fit within 
traditional mens rea elements, it was better (in this example) analysed as part of the actus 
reus. A view, of course, that also challenges the actus reus/mens rea divide.  
 
Ulterior mens rea as mens rea within the circumstance and result elements 
 
The alternative of locating ulterior mens rea within the mens rea of circumstances and results 
is most clearly exemplified by the English Law Commission, set out in their recent review of 
inchoate liability.
26
 For the Commission, ulterior requirements are examples of mens rea as to 
circumstances and results (Elements 5 and 6), with the simple difference being that the 
‘circumstance’ or ‘result’ intended does not need to come about and thus does not form part 
of the actus reus.
27
 For example, in relation to results, the Commission contends: 
 
‘We have been speaking of the need to prove intention with regard to a [act] 
or [result] element. That includes, by implication, cases in which, even for the 
substantive offence, there is a need to prove only an intention that 
something … will occur, whether or not it does occur.’28 
 
                                                 
26
 Law Commission, Conspiracy and Attempts – A Consultation Paper (Consultation No.183, 2007); Law 
Commission, Inchoate Liability for Assisting and Encouraging (Law Com No.300, 2006); Law Com No.318. 
27
 Consultation No.183 [4.6-4.15]; Law Com No.318 [2.14-2.29]. 
28
 Law Com No.318 [2.57]. For a similar discussion regarding ulterior intention and circumstances, see [2.147-
8]. Draft Bill cl.1ZA(2)(a) and 3A(2)(a). 
11 
 
Locating ulterior mens rea within mens rea elements, as corollaries of traditional mens rea 
elements as to circumstances and results, has an obvious appeal. For example, in relation to 
sexual assault, avoiding Sullivan’s problematic interpretation, the Commission can categorise 
D’s purpose to gain sexual gratification as an example of mens rea as to a result element 
(Element 6).
29
 This is because, if the offence required D to gain sexual gratification in fact, 
then such gratification would be a result element (Element 3).
30
 Despite the absence of this 
corresponding actus reus, the conceptual location of D’s mens rea is unaffected and relatively 
easy to apply.
31
      
 
However, the Commission’s policy remains conceptually problematic. It deals tolerably well 
with one-dimensional ulterior requirements, such as sexual purpose for sexual assault or an 
intention to permanently deprive in theft.
32
 Problems begin to emerge, however, when 
offences include an ulterior requirement that is not limited to a single aspect but, as with the 
general inchoate offences of attempt, conspiracy and assisting and encouraging, extends to a 
full principal offence.
33
 Where an ulterior requirement extends to a full principal offence, the 
Commission’s approach will have to accommodate every part of that offence within the mens 
rea of circumstances and results (Elements 5 and 6). This is extremely problematic. First, if 
the ulterior requirement relates to an offence to be committed by D, although any 
circumstances and results of that principal offence may be logically located within those 
                                                 
29
 Law Com No.318 [2.58]. 
30
 Establishing sexual gratification (an internal event) as an actus reus result element requires further 
justification. However, as it is not essential for this paper, it will have to wait for another occasion.   
31
 On the remaining uncertainty, see Robinson and Grall, ‘Element analysis in defining liability: The Model 
Penal Code and beyond’ (1983) SLR 681.  
32
 The approach does not, however, escape the ‘second substantive concern’ discussed in Part 2.  
33
 As Horder (n1, 156-7) has identified, offences of this type also include where D completes a crime with mens 
rea as to a further offence (eg committing a non-sexual offence with the intent to commit a sexual offence, 
Sexual Offences Act 2003, s62), where D commits a civil wrong with mens rea relating to a future offence (eg 
burglary, Theft Act 1968, s9(1)(a)), as well as where D’s mens rea as to a future offence is accompanied by 
conduct that is otherwise innocent (eg possession of anything with intent to destroy or damage property, 
Criminal Damage Act 1971, s3). 
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mens rea elements (corollaries of traditional mens rea elements as to present circumstances 
and results
34
), this is not true of mens rea as to future acts. For example, for an offence like 
burglary D must intend to complete a future act element (relating to a future principal 
offence). However, such mens rea is not a corollary of mens rea as to circumstances or 
results, it would not be an example of either of these ‘but for its lack of a corresponding actus 
reus element’. Rather, D’s mens rea as to her own future actions is a distinct form of mens rea 
that does not fit within either of the Commission’s categories.35  
 
Further problems arise for the Commission’s approach where an ulterior requirement relates 
to a full offence to be committed by another party, for example in the context of conspiracy. 
Some of this is simply an issue of complexity. For example, where D has conspired with P to 
commit murder, D’s conduct can be divided into acts, circumstances and results, as can her 
mens rea in relation to that conduct. However, within those same mens rea elements, we must 
now also locate D’s mens rea as to the actus reus elements of P’s principal offence, and her 
mens rea as to the mens rea elements of P’s principal offence. Such complexity is not 
desirable, but the structure fully breaks down when we realise that it is also not conceptually 
sound. This is most clearly evident in relation to result elements. Where D commits a choate 
offence that includes mens rea as to a result element, that mens rea does not simply relate to 
the chances of the result coming about, but rather reflects the requirement of a causal link 
with D’s action. For example, were D to commit murder as a principal offender, it would not 
be enough that she intended death or grievous bodily harm; liability requires D to intend her 
acts to cause death or grievous bodily harm.
36
 In contrast, where D conspires for example, 
                                                 
34
 For an opposing view, contending that such requirements are never conceptually equivalent, see Scottish Law 
Commission, The mental element in crime (Scot. Law Com No.80, 1983) [3.2-3.14].  
35
 See Robinson, Structure and Function in Criminal Law (OUP, 1997) 131.  
36
 Cunningham [1981] 2 All ER 863.  
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she need only intend that the result of the principal offence comes about. This intention 
relates to her anticipation of the result to be caused by another, not mens rea as to causing it 
to come about through her actions. By placing mens rea as to both categories of result within 
the same element (Element 6) despite their conceptual differences, the Commission’s 
approach is flawed.   
 
Ulterior mens rea as mens rea across existing elements  
 
Sharing several characteristics with the previous approach, a third alternative locates ulterior 
mens rea requirements across each of the mens rea elements, as well as a new element 
relating to future actions. It is an approach most clearly illustrated by Robinson.
37
 Despite 
similarities with the Commission, Robinson’s approach is nevertheless more sensitive to the 
possibility of ulterior mens rea relating to a full principal offence. Thus, rather than the two 
species of mens rea employed above, Robinson contends that the role of mens rea should be 
divided across a maximum of four separate culpability requirements (mens rea elements): 
‘present conduct intention’ relating simply to the acts of D; ‘future conduct intention’ relating 
to ulterior mens rea as to D’s future acts; ‘present circumstance culpability’ relating to 
present and potentially ulterior mens rea; and ‘future result culpability’ relating to the result 
of D’s and other parties’ actions.38 We criticised the Commission’s approach for not being 
able to locate mens rea as to D’s future acts appropriately within the circumstance or result 
element. For Robinson, however, with the addition of ‘future act intention’ he is able to 
                                                 
37
 See, Robinson, n35; Robinson, ‘A functional analysis of criminal law’ (1994) Northwestern University Law 
Review 857; Robinson and Grall, n31. 
38
 Robinson, n35, 129-137.  
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locate such mens rea within this element without compromising the coherence of other 
culpability (mens rea) elements.  
 
Despite recognising that conceptual and functional differences require the addition of a 
separate ulterior mens rea act element, Robinson does not take this logic forward into his 
analysis of the other mens rea elements. As a result, his analysis falls into many of the same 
problems discussed above, particularly with regard to ‘future result culpability’ which must 
again host mens rea as to results from both D and P. Beyond this, Robinson’s analysis also 
reveals a similar problem with regard to circumstances. This is because the device of ‘present 
circumstance culpability’, as the name suggests, is designed specifically to deal with mens 
rea as to existing ‘present’ circumstances. As Robinson remarks: 
 
‘These culpability requirements may be called instances of ‘present 
circumstance culpability’, to remind us that they refer only to culpability as to 
then present facts.’39  
 
Robinson’s focus on mens rea as to ‘present’ circumstances is important because it influences 
his definition of mens rea terms in relation to that element, for example the overlapping 
definitions of intention and knowledge.
40
 The problem, however, is that when D’s ulterior 
mens rea relates to a full principal offence, it will be necessary to assess her mens rea as to a 
future circumstance element as well. Without an equivalent approach to that of the act 
element, we are therefore left with a placement within present circumstance culpability 
                                                 
39
 Ibid. 
40
 Ibid. 130.  
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(where mens rea definitions may not be appropriate to the anticipation of future 
circumstances), or future result culpability (where the problem regarding causation arises 
once more). Yet again, it seems that the conceptual differences within ulterior forms of mens 
rea require, but are not provided with, separate treatment.   
 
Although we are exposing the conceptual differences between present mens rea elements and 
ulterior mens rea as a critique of Robinson’s approach, it is interesting to note that the 
separate analysis of ulterior mens rea may benefit his wider thesis: the functional analysis of 
crime.
41
 Distinguishing the functions of elements between ‘rule articulation’ (designed to 
guide behaviour), ‘liability’ (setting the rules for criminal intervention) and ‘grading’ 
(establishing the seriousness of a violation), Robinson often stresses the distinct role of the 
result element and result culpability (Elements 3 and 6).
42
 This is because, for Robinson, 
unlike actions and circumstances, results (actus reus and mens rea) do not have a functional 
role in relation to liability. Rather, because of ‘outcome luck’,43 the presence or absence of 
results will only play a role in relation to grading. However, when accounting for mens rea as 
to future (ulterior) results, this position is then compromised: in attempts liability, for 
example, D’s actions may be otherwise innocent and so it must be her mens rea as to future 
events that justifies liability (serving the liability function). Although Robinson recognises 
this as an exception,
44
 it is a compromise to his overall thesis that would be unnecessary if 
ulterior mens rea were separated from other offence elements. At minimum, the need for this 
exception provides further recognition of the conceptual differences we have identified.      
 
                                                 
41
 See generally, Robinson, n35. 
42
 See, Robinson, n35, 128-129 and 132.  
43
 ‘Outcome luck’ arises from our inability to control consequences. Ashworth, ‘The Problem of Luck’ in Action 
and Value in Criminal Law, Shute et al (eds.) (OUP, 1993) 107. 
44
 Robinson, n35, 132-137.  
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Ulterior mens rea as a distinct mens rea element 
 
The final approach to be considered was set out within the recent Irish Draft Criminal Code.
45
 
In line with the approach advocated in this paper, the Irish Code recognises conceptual 
differences between traditional mens rea elements and ulterior mens rea, severing its 
discussion of ulterior intention from other offence elements. 
 
‘A person acts with “ulterior intention” where, with respect to some objective 
that is neither a conduct, circumstance nor result element of an offence (a) his 
or her mind is directed towards the achievement of that objective, or (b) he or 
she is aware that that objective will be achieved in the ordinary course of 
events as a consequence of the achievement of some other objective to which 
his or her mind is directed.’46  
 
In this manner, the Irish approach provides an opportunity to avoid the conceptual problems 
discussed above, with no need to view ulterior mens rea as a corollary of other offence 
elements. However, the Irish Code still falls into error by limiting its separation to ulterior 
intention alone. An example of the confusion caused can be demonstrated in relation to 
aggravated property damage. Similar to its English equivalent, this offence is defined as 
requiring D to cause damage ‘intending by the damage to endanger the life of another or 
being reckless as to whether the life of another would be thereby endangered.’47 Setting out 
the elements of this offence, the Code Commentary clearly recognises the required intention 
                                                 
45
 Draft Code, n11.  
46
 Ibid. Head 1111 (emphasis added). 
47
 Ibid. Head 5103 (emphasis added). 
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as ulterior (separating it from acts, circumstances and results). However, when dealing with 
the recklessness equivalent, this is presented as mens rea as to a circumstance element (the 
potential endangerment of life).
48
 This is plainly incorrect. Although the offence requires 
intention or recklessness as to the potential endangerment of life, in neither case is the 
potential endangerment required in fact: both should be separated as ulterior mens rea 
requirements.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The conceptual problem discussed in this Part (the incoherence of locating ulterior mens rea 
within existing elements) forms the basis for our substantive concerns in Parts 2 and 3. 
However, it is contended the potential for conceptual coherence is sufficient to justify the 
recognition of the new ulterior mens rea element in its own right.    
 
In this regard, the debate above has not simply been about which offence element is best 
suited to accommodate a particular offence requirement. Such debates are longstanding 
within element analysis;
49
 they are important, but the problems identified are significantly 
less damaging than our current concern. With ulterior mens rea, we have offence 
requirements that appear to undermine the integrity of any traditional offence element that is 
employed. However, the new element provides the potential for coherence. Actus reus 
elements can be correctly confined to the physical conduct of D (Element 1), causal 
                                                 
48
 Ibid.  
49
 See, Buxton ‘The Working Paper on Inchoate offences: Incitement and Attempt’ [1973] CrimLR 656; 
Williams, ‘Intents in the alternative’ (1991) CLJ 120; Robinson and Grall, n31. 
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consequences of that conduct (Element 3) or the surrounding facts necessary for liability 
(Element 2). Equally, the established mens rea elements (Elements 4-6) can maintain their 
derivative nature, accompanying and attaching to elements of the actus reus. The new ulterior 
mens rea element (Element 7) is able to recognise and make sense of a genuinely unique 
additional category of offence element: mens rea requirements that are not connected to, that 
are ulterior to, the actus reus.  
 
Part 2: The substantive concerns for inchoate liability  
 
Until recently, the general inchoate offences of attempt, conspiracy and incitement (now 
assisting and encouraging) have required D to act with the intention that a principal offence 
will be completed. Therefore, if that principal offence were to contain an ulterior mens rea 
requirement, that requirement must also be intended. This was unproblematic. The 
conceptual problem was present (we may have disagreed on what D was intending), but there 
was no substantive concern in application: whatever it was, it had to be intended. 
 
However, in recent years, the general inchoate offences of attempt and assisting and 
encouraging have adopted an approach to mens rea that distinguishes between the elements 
of the principal offence attempted, assisted or encouraged. This change is explicit within the 
new offences of assisting and encouraging.
50
 Within attempts, although section 1(1) of the 
Criminal Attempts Act 1981 specifies that D must act with the ‘intent to commit an offence’, 
                                                 
50
 Serious Crime Act 2007, Part 2. 
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this has been interpreted in Khan
51
 to apply only to the result element of a principal offence 
(Element 3), with mens rea as to circumstances (Element 2) reflecting that required for 
principal liability. Therefore, in order to apply either of these inchoate offences, it is essential 
that the target principal offence can be separated within the element analysis structure. It is 
only when the principal offence has been separated into these elements that we may then 
identify what mens rea (for inchoate liability) is required by D in relation to each part.  
 
Therefore, in order to apply inchoate offences to a principal offence that contains an ulterior 
mens rea requirement, it must be possible to locate that ulterior requirement within an offence 
element (Elements 1-6). However, as discussed in Part 1, this is not conceptually viable. This 
impasse represents our first substantive concern for inchoate liability.    
 
This concern was brought to life in the case of AG Ref (No.3 of 1992), the first occasion in 
which the post-Khan approach to attempts was applied to a principal offence containing an 
ulterior mens rea requirement of less than intention.
52
 It will be remembered that AG Ref 
(No.3 of 1992) involved an offence of attempted aggravated arson where D intended to cause 
damage, but was merely reckless as to the potential endangerment of life. D’s liability 
therefore turned on whether the ulterior requirement of being reckless as to the endangerment 
of life should be classified as either a circumstance element (where D’s recklessness would 
suffice for attempt liability) or a result element (where D’s lack of intention would lead to 
acquittal). 
 
                                                 
51
 [1990] 1 WLR 813. 
52
 Where an ulterior requirement specifies intention, mens rea will not vary for attempts whether it is classified 
as a circumstance or result, making the distinction less problematic.   
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For the court, a choice between conceptually flawed alternatives was always going to leave 
their conclusions open to criticism and disagreement. Indeed, we see this with the court of 
first instance acquitting D (having concluded that the ulterior mens rea requirement was best 
analysed as a result element
53
), and the Court of Appeal concluding that liability should have 
been found. However, this disagreement was not simply a preference for different (equally 
problematic) alternatives, the Appeal Court did not disagree because they preferred to analyse 
the ulterior mens rea requirement as a circumstance element (allowing for liability post-
Khan). Rather, what has made this case particularly interesting, and so controversial, is that 
despite concluding that liability should have been found, the Appeal Court did not explicitly 
reject the earlier Court’s identification of ulterior mens rea as part of the result element. 
Instead, the Appeal Court attempted to avoid the conceptual debate altogether by adopting an 
alternative approach to the mens rea of attempts that had been recently outlined by 
Stannard.
54
 However, with this alternative approach attracting little support,
55
 the Court of 
Appeal simply succeeded in introducing a further layer of confusion. This is because, if the 
lower Court was right to identify the ulterior requirement as a result element, then AG Ref 
(No.3 of 1992) seems to be extending the Khan precedent by allowing for attempt liability 
where D is reckless as to a result (as opposed to circumstances only). However, if it is not a 
result element, if it is a circumstance, then there is no such implication.
56
 Thus, not only is the 
conceptual problem left unresolved, but now it must be resolved in order to conclude whether 
the Khan precedent still applies.  
 
                                                 
53
 AG Ref (No.3 of 1992) at 411 (quoting Judge Norrie).  
54
 Ibid. 418 [C-D] (Schiemann J) referring to D’s need to intend the ‘missing physical element’. See, Stannard, 
‘Making up for the missing element – a sideways look at attempts’ (1987) LS, 194.     
55
 For criticism, see Duff, ‘The circumstances of an attempt’ (1991) CLJ, 100, 111-112; Duff, ‘Recklessness in 
attempts (again)’ (1995) OJLS, 309, 311-312; and Duff, Criminal Attempts (OUP, 1996) 14-15. 
56
 Although it is important not to overcomplicate our analysis, it should be noted that at the time AG Ref (No.3 of 
1992) was decided, ‘recklessness’ could be satisfied subjectively or objectively. Our analysis of this case, in line 
with the current law, will focus on subjective recklessness. For discussion in relation to conspiracy, see, 
Ormerod, ‘Making sense of mens rea in statutory conspiracy’ (2006) CLP, 185, 194-197.      
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Similar difficulties are also apparent within the surrounding academic commentaries, with 
very little agreement on how the case should be presented. For commentators following the 
interpretation of the court of first instance, AG Ref (No.3 of 1992) represents the often 
criticised extension of Khan.
57
 However, others have interpreted the ulterior requirement as a 
circumstance element, making liability consistent with the Khan principle.
58
 Indeed, others 
still have stated with confidence that the ulterior requirement is either not a result,
59
 or not a 
circumstance,
60
 but then struggled to fill the analytical void created.
61
 Unfortunately, when 
looking to this debate for guidance on the root conceptual problem discussed in Part 1, little 
can be found. This is because, as the interpretation of AG Ref (No.3 of 1992) has the potential 
to significantly widen the scope of attempt liability (by allowing for recklessness as to result 
elements), the normative question of whether liability should be expanded in this manner has 
dominated and distorted any conceptual enquiry.
62
 It is the merging of these two separate 
debates within AG Ref (No.3 of 1992), inevitable where such conceptual problems affect the 
substance of the law, that confuses and undermines both. 
 
As well as demonstrating the first substantive concern (the lottery of applying inchoate 
liability without the necessary conceptual guidance), the emergence of normative debates 
surrounding AG Ref (No.3 of 1992) also serves to highlight a second concern. As concluded 
in Part 1, ulterior mens rea is conceptually distinct from mens rea as to other offence 
elements. Therefore, just as the mens rea for inchoate liability is designed to take account of 
                                                 
57
 See, Simester et al, n16, 339 and 342.  
58
 See, Davis, ‘Signals of symmetry in reckless attempts’ (1996) Anglo.Am.L.R, 367, 371; and Case Comment, 
‘Attempted aggravated criminal damage – “with intent to commit (the) offence”’ (1994) Arch.N. 4, 5, the latter 
referring to the state of mind as ‘a kind of circumstance.’    
59
 See, Smith, ‘Attempts’ (Case Comment: O’Toole [1987] CrimLR 759) (1987) CrimLR 759, 761.  
60
 See, Elliott, ‘Endangering life by destroying or damaging property’ (1997) CrimLR 382, 394. 
61
 See, Simester et al, n16, 340. Having discussed the requirement as a result element, the authors recognise that 
it could be interpreted as an ulterior part of the mens rea. However, they do not examine the implications.   
62
 See, Smith, n59, 759, 761. See also, Case Comment, ‘Attempted aggravated criminal damage – “with intent to 
commit (the) offence”’ (1994) Arch.N. 4. Cf. Elliott, n60, 394.  
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the differences between circumstances and results within the principal offence (requiring 
different levels of mens rea), so the conceptually distinct requirement of ulterior mens rea 
requires equally separate normative consideration. Thus, our problem is not simply that 
current elements are unsuitable (the first substantive concern). Rather, in order to set an 
appropriate mens rea requirement for inchoate liability in relation to an ulterior mens rea 
requirement within a principal offence, that requirement must be capable of separate 
consideration and application (the second substantive concern).      
 
This second substantive concern is important as part of our rejection of the alternative 
approaches discussed in Part 1 that attempt to locate ulterior mens rea within current offence 
elements. This is because, if our only substantive concern was confusion as to which offence 
element should be used to accommodate ulterior mens rea, we could simply adopt the 
approach of the Commission or Robinson explored above. Although such approaches are 
conceptually problematic, they would at least provide some certainty when applying inchoate 
offences that vary mens rea between principal offence elements. It would be clear in relation 
to AG Ref (No.3 of 1992) for example, that D’s ulterior mens rea formed part of the result 
element mens rea of the principal offence (Element 6), requiring D to intend it for attempt 
liability (if we follow Khan). However, although this approach would make clear what mens 
rea is required, the choice of mens rea would not be drawn from a normative discussion 
taking account of the unique role of ulterior mens rea. Rather, in this example, it is the 
conclusion from a normative debate taking account of the conceptually distinct role of result 
elements. In this manner, the confusion may be removed, but its cost is a rigidly applied 
approach to mens rea that disregards the unique function of ulterior mens rea.    
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The only way to resolve both of these substantive concerns is through the recognition of a 
new ulterior mens rea element. The chart illustrates an inchoate offence that includes a 
requirement of ulterior mens rea as to a full principal offence. Every element of the principal 
offence is contained within element 7; they are relevant to D’s liability only as requirements 
of ulterior mens rea. Within this principal offence, any ulterior mens rea specified by that 
offence will be located within element P7.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The simple inclusion of the new ulterior mens rea element provides the conceptual coherence 
that is essential to resolve both of the substantive concerns identified for inchoate liability. In 
relation to the first substantive concern, it is clear that any ulterior mens rea requirements 
within an offence should be located consistently within the new element. Element 7 
represents the ulterior mens rea required of D for liability. Within element 7, where this 
applies to a full principal offence, this principal offence is also divided into elements 
Inchoate Offence Actus Reus Mens Rea 
Acts Element 1 Element 4 
Circumstances Element 2 Element 5 
Results Element 3 Element 6 
Ulterior mens rea   
Element 7 
Principal offence Actus Reus Mens Rea 
Acts Element P1 Element P4 
Circumstances Element P2 Element P5 
Results Element P3 Element P6 
Ulterior mens rea  Element P7 
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(Elements P1-7).
63
 In line with the current approach to attempts and assisting and 
encouraging, we may then specify a distinct mens rea requirement for D (for inchoate 
liability) in relation to each element of the principal offence. Where that principal offence 
itself includes an ulterior mens rea requirement, this requirement does not need to be 
(inappropriately) accommodated within the other elements (Elements P1-6). Rather, such a 
requirement will come within element P7.     
 
In relation to second substantive concern, by separating ulterior mens rea within a new 
offence element, it is now possible to ask (in the context of inchoate liability) what mens rea 
should be required of D where such an element is present within a principal offence (Element 
P7).
64
 It is a debate that should take account of the mens rea required as to other elements of 
the principal offence (Elements P1-6), but it is separated from them. It is to this debate that 
we now turn.     
 
Part 3: Setting the mens rea for inchoate liability 
 
In this Part, for the first time, we allow ourselves to consider normative debates about what 
the mens rea for inchoate liability should be. Within these debates, our primary focus will be 
the mens rea of D (for inchoate liability) as to an ulterior mens rea requirement within a 
                                                 
63
 In the context of attempt, for example, elements 1-6 contain D’s actus reus and mens rea as to going beyond 
mere preparation, where element 7 (separated into elements P1-7) contains D’s mens rea as to the principal 
offence attempted.  
64
 Despite separating their analysis of ulterior intention, the Irish Draft Code does not explore the substantive 
concerns with inchoate liability. Rather, this is left to the review of the Irish Law Commission. Unfortunately, 
the Irish Commission not only reject the use of element analysis (and the separation of ulterior mens rea), but 
recommend an approach that makes little effort to engage with inchoate liability as a conceptually distinct form 
of liability at all. See, Child and Hunt, 'Mens rea and the general inchoate offences: another new culpability 
framework' (2012) NILQ, 245. 
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principal offence (Element P7). Above, we introduced this in the context of AG Ref (No.3 of 
1992). In this case, the issue was what mens rea should be required of D for attempt liability, 
in relation to the anticipation of life being endangered (the ulterior requirement of the 
principal offence, aggravated arson).  
 
Within this discussion, four key questions require attention. First, having explained that it 
may be desirable to consider D’s mens rea as to the ulterior mens rea of the principal offence 
separately from other elements (the second substantive concern), we begin with a discussion 
of why this is always the case. Secondly, having established the rationale for separation, we 
ask whether the same can be, or even has been, achieved without the proposed element? 
Thirdly, concluding that the current law is inadequate, we set out the potential benefits of our 
proposed scheme. Finally, we explore a potential problem for the proposed scheme where the 
principal offence (the subject of the inchoate charge) is to be committed by D herself.     
 
Why should we consider mens rea as to ulterior mens rea separately from mens rea as to 
other principal offence elements?      
 
Although the proposed ulterior mens rea element provides a mechanism for separating 
ulterior mens rea from other offences elements, it is important to establish why such 
separation is desirable for the mens rea of inchoate liability. The most obvious answer to this 
is that it is desirable because ulterior mens rea is conceptually distinct from other elements. 
However, although this justifies separation within a conceptual model of analysis, it does 
little to satisfy the normative challenge: just because we can separate the elements of a 
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principal offence, this does not necessitate that we should distinguish them in relation to the 
mens rea required of D. Therefore, although the conceptual differences within ulterior mens 
rea highlight the potential for bespoke treatment within the mens rea of inchoate liability, the 
fact of difference should not (it is contended) be viewed as sufficient to establish the need for 
such treatment. The key to the normative challenge lays in the nature (not the simple fact) of 
conceptual differences.
65
        
 
It is contended that the separate treatment of ulterior mens rea is indeed desirable in the 
context of the mens rea of inchoate liability. This is because, unlike other offence elements 
that focus on current facts and events, ulterior mens rea (by its nature) focuses on the future. 
As a result, the wrong within D’s ulterior mens rea is always at least one step removed from 
its potential harm. For example, an intention to permanently deprive in theft (ulterior mens 
rea) involves the potential future harm of permanent deprivation, a harm that has not yet 
befallen V. As a result of this abstraction from harm, it is standard for offences including 
ulterior mens rea to require a high level of mens rea as to this element for liability to be 
found: since D has not completed the relevant harm, the criminal law should only take 
interest where D’s commitment to bring it about was particularly strong. As Ashworth has 
neatly expressed:  
 
… as the form of criminal liability moves further away from the infliction of 
harm, so the grounds of liability should become more narrow.
66
           
                                                 
65
 This conclusion challenges the current laws approach to attempt and assisting an encouraging, both of which 
vary the mens rea required for the different elements of the principal offence. This challenge is examined in 
Child and Hunt, n64. However, it need not be explored further in this paper.  
66
 Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5
th
 ed, 2006) 423; endorsed by the Law Commission in Consultation 
No.183 [1.6-1.7] and Law Com No.300 [5.86].  
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When designing the mens rea for general inchoate liability, there is therefore reason to 
require a higher level of mens rea as to the elements of a principal offence than is required for 
standard principal liability: in the context of an inchoate charge, D’s commitment to the 
principal offence is an example of ulterior mens rea (Element 7). Beyond this, where that 
principal offence itself includes a requirement of ulterior mens rea (Element P7), there is 
therefore also reason for requiring a higher level of mens rea as to this element beyond other 
elements of the principal offence: the mens rea within this element is at least two steps 
removed from potential harm. However, as the current law (without an ulterior mens rea 
element) is unable to distinguish this second abstraction within the principal offence, there is 
potential for over-criminalisation. For example, if (as with assisting and encouraging) we 
have a policy that only requires recklessness as to the circumstances and results of the 
principal offence, without separating ulterior mens rea from those circumstances and results, 
recklessness is all what will be required here as well. The form of criminal liability has 
moved further from the infliction of harm, but we have no tools to isolate it in order to 
narrow the grounds of liability.   
 
Does the current law over-criminalise? 
 
The potential for over-criminalisation, in the present context, can arise whenever two factors 
are present. First, there must be an inchoate offence with mens rea requirements of less than 
intention as to certain elements of a principal offence (currently attempt and assisting and 
encouraging). Secondly, this inchoate offence must be applied to a principal offence that 
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itself includes a requirement of ulterior mens rea. Where this is the case, the concern is that 
despite the ulterior requirement within the principal offence being at least two steps removed 
from potential harm, without the tools to separate this requirement and increase the level of 
mens rea specified in relation to it, liability may be left unacceptably broad. It is our view 
(shared by other commentaries in this area
67
) that D should only be liable in relation to such 
an abstracted wrong if she intended that it should come about.  
 
Although this potential for over-criminalisation may operate for any principal offence that 
contains an ulterior mens rea requirement, the dangers of over-criminalisation are most 
clearly evident in the context of infinite inchoate liability. Infinite inchoate liability describes 
a criminal construction where D’s inchoate offence is targeted at a principal offence that is 
also inchoate in nature, and thus, the ulterior mens rea of the principal offence relates to a 
further full offence (let us call it the ‘future’ offence).68 Although the paradigms of this class 
of liability involve general inchoate offences, it may include any combination of offences 
where the ulterior mens rea of the principal offence relates to a full future offence. For 
example, just as D commits an offence of this kind if she encourages P to conspire with X to 
commit an offence of criminal damage, so the same pattern will be employed where D 
encourages P to possess an item with the intention to commit criminal damage. These 
constructions are important because where the ulterior requirement of a principal offence 
itself contains a full future offence, D’s mens rea as to that ulterior requirement is particularly 
crucial to defining liability. Where D’s offence is encouraging P to conspire with X to 
commit criminal damage for example, this ‘future offence’ is the criminal damage. Our 
                                                 
67
 See n69. 
68
 Although we employ the label ‘infinite inchoate liability’, it is acknowledged that this is not strictly accurate: 
liability will always require a principal offence at the end of the chain even if there are several inchoate links. 
Indeed, it has been suggested on blind review that the label ‘nested inchoate liability’ may be preferable, and I 
agree. However, for ease of understanding, I continue to employ the label ‘infinite’ in line with contemporary 
Law Commission material.    
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question becomes: what mens rea is required of D in relation to P’s mens rea as to X’s 
commission of criminal damage? Must D intend that P will act with the required ulterior 
mens rea, or is it enough that she should be (for example) reckless? 
 
In line with our preference, it is interesting that commentators have generally assumed that 
the current law will only allow for infinite inchoate liability where D intends that both the 
principal and future offences will be completed.
69
 This view seems principally based on the 
Serious Crime Act 2007 (assisting and encouraging) where only section 44 (Intentionally 
encouraging or assisting an offence) can apply to other inchoate offences, with the other 
belief based offences (sections 45 and 46) explicitly excluded.
70
 Thus, although D’s conduct 
is at least two steps removed from the criminal harm, liability is justified by her direct 
intention that those steps should be completed.  
 
Unfortunately, despite this assumption that infinite inchoate liability is limited by an intention 
requirement, this is not borne out within the legislation: there is a wish to maintain such a 
restriction, but a lack of tools to achieve it. The first problem relates to the method used 
within the Serious Crime Act 2007 to restrict infinite inchoate liability to the section 44 
offence, providing a list of principal offences excluded from sections 45 and 46.
71
 The 
problem here, simply, is that not all offences of the relevant class (requiring mens rea as to a 
full future offence) are included as listed offences. Such absences include, for example, 
                                                 
69
 See, Simester et al, n16, 292-293, stating that D must ‘intend D2 to assist, encourage, conspire to commit, or 
attempt the substantive offence’; Ormerod, n16, 472-473, stating that D’s liability arises ‘only if it was his direct 
intention that P should’ commit the principal (inchoate) offence; Ormerod and Fortson, ‘Serious Crime Act 
2007: the Part 2 offences’ (2009) CrimLR., 409-410, stating that D’s liability is again contingent on ‘his direct 
intention’ that P should complete the offence.    
70
 Serious Crime Act 2007, s49(4)&(5).  
71
 Ibid.  
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burglary,
72
 a host of inchoate sexual offences
73
 and even double inchoate sexual offences.
74
 
Therefore, even if infinite inchoate liability can be justified under section 44, the current law 
is already allowing liability beyond this restriction. 
 
The second (more serious) problem is that, even if liability of this type were limited to the 
section 44 offence,
75
 despite contrary assumptions, this offence does not limit infinite 
inchoate liability by requiring D to intend the principal and/or future offences. For example, 
Ormerod and Fortson observe: 
 
‘Under s.44 D can be convicted of an offence if he performs acts capable of 
assisting or encouraging P to attempt to commit an offence. The Commission 
proposed that D should be liable in such a case but only if it was his direct 
intention that P should attempt the offence’76 
 
However, despite the appeal of this approach in terms of limiting infinite inchoate liability, it 
does not represent the approach recommended by the Commission,
77
 and it does not represent 
the current law. In fact, although section 44 is characterised (and distinguished from the other 
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 Theft Act 1968, s9(1)(a).  
73
 For example, Sexual Offences Act 2003, s8 (Causing or inciting a child under 13 to engage in sexual activity); 
s10 (Causing or inciting a child to engage in sexual activity). 
74
 Sexual Offences Act 2003, s14 (Arranging or facilitating commission of a child sex offence). A ‘child sex 
offence’ here includes inchoate offences under ss8 and 10.   
75
 It is possible, of course, to add relevant offences to those already excluded from ss45 and 46. Serious Crime 
Act 2007, s49(6).  
76
 Ormerod and Fortson, n69, 409. Interestingly, outside of the context of infinite inchoate liability, Ormerod 
and Fortson recognise that intention is not required (406).  
77
 Ormerod and Fortson make reference to statements within Law Com No.300 [7.23] that D should ‘only’ be 
liable if she intends the principal offence (criminal attempt). However, in the following paragraph setting out 
their recommendations, the Commission clarify this to include ‘intending that P should attempt, or be 
encouraged to attempt, to commit the offence’ (my emphasis). Thus, as is also clear in the Commission’s 
appended draft Bill, D must intend her conduct to assist or encourage, but she does not have to intend P to 
complete the principal offence.     
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Part 2 offences) by requiring intention, it is clear that this requirement does not extend very 
widely at all. D must intend her acts to assist or encourage P to commit a principal offence, 
but it is debatable whether she must also intend any element of the principal offence to be 
completed.
78
 Certainly, in relation to the circumstance element, result element and mens rea 
elements of the principal offence, it is clear that D need only foresee a risk that each would be 
completed by P.
79
 Therefore, it is also clear that, whether the current law would categorise the 
ulterior mens rea of the principal offence (the future offence) as a circumstance, result or 
mens rea element, mere recklessness is required here (in relation to this ulterior mens rea) as 
well.  In the absence of special rules relating to infinite inchoate liability, D’s liability is more 
accurately characterised, not in terms of intending an offence, but rather in terms of intending 
to create a risk of future offending.
80
  
 
The scope of infinite inchoate liability (even limited to the section 44 offence) is therefore 
considerably wider than the justificatory examples provided by the Commission. Taking one 
of those examples,  
 
‘D, knowing that P is planning to act as X’s getaway driver in a robbery, lends 
a car to P so that P can provide assistance to X’81 
 
                                                 
78
 If such an intention is required, then it is limited to the act element of P’s principal offence alone. However, as 
the Serious Crime Act is silent on this point, an alternative interpretation is that D need only be reckless as to the 
act element. See, Child, n18.     
79
 Serious Crime Act 2007, s47(5).  
80
 See, Child, n18. 
81
 Law Com No.300, [7.1]. 
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The Commission make a convincing case that this example of infinite inchoate liability 
(assisting P to assist X) should be a criminal offence.
82
 We agree. However, let us consider 
some variations of this example in light of our discussion of section 44 above. D must intend 
to assist P to commit the act element of the principal offence: intend to assist P to drive. 
Beyond this, however, no more than recklessness is required. Thus, D may be reckless as to 
whether P will try to assist X; D may believe that, even if P did try to assist X that X would 
not commit the future offence; indeed D may even be merely reckless as to whether P thinks 
there is any chance that X might commit the robbery. If the paradigm of the criminal law is 
punishment for harms caused, here we have extended liability beyond D intending to cause 
harm or even intending to risk harm. Rather, D is liable for intending to create a risk that P 
will create a risk that X might cause harm. The potential breadth of these offences, well 
beyond the Commission’s justificatory examples, becomes worryingly clear.83  
 
How can we prevent this form of over-criminalisation? 
 
Having exposed the potential for liability far beyond that advocated and justified by the 
Commission and other commentators, our discussion now turns to how we might provide 
some more acceptable limits (limits that have been assumed, but are not present within the 
current law).  
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 Ibid. Part 7.  
83
 D’s act of assistance or encouragement does not have to be as substantial as the lending of a car. The same 
mens rea requirements will apply when D performs any act that is capable of providing assistance or 
encouragement.   
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It is our belief that such limits are best achieved through the offence model (including the 
new ulterior mens rea element) advocated in this paper. This is because, just as inchoate 
offences (such as the new assisting and encouraging offences) can specify a certain mens rea 
requirement in relation to the other elements of the principal offence (Elements P1-6), so a 
specific mens rea requirement could be set in relation to P’s ulterior mens rea element 
(Element P7). To provide the necessary restriction to liability, particularly in the context of 
infinite inchoate liability, it is contended that D should always be required to intend this 
element. Where the ulterior mens rea within the principal offence relates to a full future 
offence, element P7 can be analysed in a similar way to element 7, accommodating each 
element of that future offence. This can be illustrated in the following form:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Inchoate Offence Actus 
Reus 
Mens Rea 
Acts Element 1 Element 4 
Circumstances Element 2 Element 5 
Results Element 3 Element 6 
Ulterior mens rea   Element 7 
Principal offence Actus Reus Mens Rea 
Acts Element P1 Element P4 
Circumstances Element P2 Element P5 
Results Element P3 Element P6 
Ulterior mens rea  Element P7 Element P7 
Future offence Actus Reus Mens Rea 
Acts Element F1 Element F4 
Circumstances Element F2 Element F5 
Results Element F3 Element F6 
Ulterior mens rea  Element F7 
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In this case, as the ulterior element of the principal offence amounts to a full future offence, 
D must intend that (if the principal offence is completed) that the requirement of ulterior 
mens rea is also present (Element P7). Thus, to be liable for assisting P to assist X to commit 
robbery for example, D’s mens rea in relation to P’s acts, circumstances and results remain as 
stated within the current law. However, in relation to P’s ulterior mens rea (Element P7), D 
must at least intend that P will have the requisite mens rea as to X committing robbery. Such 
a restriction has the potential to apply consistently as between different inchoate offences; it 
does not rely on a statutory listing exercise of inchoate offences; and it also isolates for 
special treatment only that element of the principal offence which looks forward to the 
second inchoate link.
84
 
 
A problem case: Criminal Attempts 
 
In the cases discussed above, chiefly relating to assisting and encouraging, D foresees that the 
principal offence will be committed by another party. However, a further complexity (often 
overlooked within the current literature) arises in cases where the principal offence is to be 
committed by D herself. This will arise in the context of attempts, and most bespoke inchoate 
offences, as well as certain conspiracies. It is a problem that is apparent within the current 
law, but also within our preferred approach.   
  
                                                 
84
 The separation of the principal offence into elements is essential in order to identify the mens rea required of 
D that may vary between each. In a similar manner, rather than simply requiring intention as to element P7 of 
the principal offence, we could use the separation of the elements of the future offence (within element P7) to 
provide a similarly varied approach. However, the complexity involved does not appear to be balanced with any 
obvious advantages. Therefore, our policy is simply to require D to intend element P7 (and thus to intend every 
element of the future offence within element P7).    
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The problem with attempts (and other inchoate offences where D is to commit the principal 
offence), is that it becomes necessary for D to have certain mens rea in relation to her own 
mens rea for the ulterior element of the principal offence (Element P7). Where the principal 
offence is not to be committed by D this problem does not arise. For example, if D assists P 
to commit arson reckless as to the endangerment of life, it is perfectly logical to require D to 
(as preferred above) intend that P should be at least reckless.
85
 However, where D has 
attempted (for example) to commit arson reckless as to the endangerment of life, it is now 
required that D should intend that she herself will be reckless. Unlike the two party cases, it is 
not immediately obvious how the law should make sense of such a requirement. Indeed, the 
court of first instance leading to AG Ref (No.3 of 1992) concluded that it would be 
‘impossible’.86  
 
Before we consider how this problem might be resolved, it is important to acknowledge its 
limited scope. First, the problem does not extend to other mens rea elements within the 
principal offence (Elements P4-6). This is because, where D attempts (for example) to 
commit an offence under the current law, she must have certain mens rea in relation each 
actus reus element of the principal offence (Elements P1-3), a mens rea that is usually 
intention and never less than the mens rea required for principal liability. Thus, as D must 
satisfy this higher mens rea in relation to the actus reus elements of the principal offence, it is 
never necessary to consider her mens rea separately in relation to the mens rea elements: 
these are implicitly satisfied through her intention to bring about the actus reus. The problem 
with the ulterior mens rea element (as opposed to the other mens rea elements) is that because 
it does not correspond with an actus reus element that must be intended, we are forced to 
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 D’s intention need not be an intention to cause P’s state of mind. Rather, D’s intention need only demonstrate 
a desire or virtually certain belief that P will act with such mens rea.  
86
 AG Ref (No.3 of 1992) at 415[B].  
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consider D’s mens rea in relation to it directly. Secondly, the scope of the problem is also 
limited by the mens rea often required in relation to ulterior mens rea. Although we have 
criticised the use of the label ‘ulterior intention’, it is nevertheless true that most ulterior 
mens rea requirements are based on intention. Where this is the case, and we have an 
inchoate offence relating to it, it is relatively easy to interpret an intention for oneself to 
intend as a requirement that D must (simply) intend the ulterior element. Thus, although 
troublesome, the problem will only arise for inchoate offences directed at principal offences 
that contain an ulterior mens rea requirement of less than intention. This is a very limited 
class, but one that remains important. 
 
The question then, for this limited class, is how we make sense of a requirement that D 
should intend to be reckless as to an ulterior element of a principal offence. Perhaps the most 
obvious answer, and the one employed by the court of first instance leading to AG Ref (No.3 
of 1992),
87
 is that intention should be required. Thus, where D must intend that she will be 
reckless within an ulterior element, this will translate into D having to intend the ulterior 
element. The advantage of this approach is that, through a requirement of intention, we can 
restrict infinite inchoate liability. Particularly in relation to offences like attempted assisting 
and encouraging for example, a requirement that D must intend that the elements of the future 
offence (the offence assisted or encouraged) should come about is considerably more 
restrictive than the alternative of recklessness. Thus, it would overturn the decision in AG Ref 
(No.3 of 1992); D would avoid liability because he did not intend the endangerment of life. 
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 AG Ref (No.3 of 1992) at 411 (quoting Judge Norrie).  
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However, we do not believe that this interpretation is correct. In fact, in the majority of 
cases,
88
 it is contended that an intention to personally possess a certain mens rea 
(recklessness for example) should translate simply as a requirement to have that mens rea. 
This is because, although it is difficult to make sense of someone intending themselves to be 
reckless in terms of a desire to be reckless, it is plausible when we think of an expanded 
notion of intention based on knowledge and foresight of a virtual certainty.
89
 Thus, if D 
attempts to commit aggravated arson for example, and D is reckless as to the endangerment 
of life, it is possible to say that she was intending to be reckless because she knew she was 
reckless at the point of attempt. Even in the case of incomplete attempts or conspiracy, it will 
almost always be the case that D’s current recklessness as to an ulterior mens rea element can 
be translated into knowledge that she will also be at least reckless at the foreseen point of the 
principal offence.
90
  
 
This interpretation, though perhaps controversial, would not create an over-criminalising 
exception to the multi-party cases discussed above. This is because, although in both cases 
recklessness is all that is required for the ulterior element of the principal offence, the multi-
party case includes the added risk (mitigated, but not avoided by a requirement of intention 
from D) that the principal offender (P) may not in fact be reckless. By contrast, where D is 
intending herself to be reckless, her knowledge of her own recklessness does not include such 
an additional risk. Therefore, even when standing back from this rather formulaic analysis, it 
                                                 
88
 See n90 below.  
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 Woollin [1999] AC 82. 
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 There will be limited circumstances where this may not be the case. For example, if D makes a plan to let off 
a bomb in a day’s time she may be genuinely unsure (at the time of the conspiracy) if there will be an 
endangerment of life, but know that she will be aware one way or another when completing the principal 
offence. This, it is submitted, would be a case where D is reckless as to her future recklessness, and not 
intending or knowing it. This will fall short of liability.   
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is clear that our conclusion is also consistent in more general terms with the normative 
position advanced in this part of the paper.      
  
If this approach were accepted, it is interesting to note that the decisions in AG Ref (No.3 of 
1992) (allowing recklessness as to ulterior mens rea in attempt) and Mir
91
 (requiring 
knowledge of another’s recklessness for conspiracy) would both be correct. Both cases can 
rightly be criticised for the methods employed to reach those decisions, particularly through 
their identification of ulterior mens rea as either a circumstance or result element.
92
 However, 
they should not be criticised, as they have been in Archbold News for example,
93
  for being 
inconsistent. Although the mens rea requirements are different in each case, it is contended 
that this can be readily explained as a reflection of the structural differences currently under 
discussion. In both, we may say that intention is required from D as to the ulterior element of 
reckless endangerment within the principal offence (Element P7). However, whereas this 
translates into an intention that another party be reckless in multi-party cases like Mir, in 
single party cases like AG Ref (No.3 of 1992) this (intending oneself to be reckless) is best 
interpreted as a simple requirement of recklessness as to the ulterior element. 
 
Conclusion 
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 Mir (Unreported, 1994) (CA). See, Case Comment, ‘Conspiracy to commit aggravated criminal damage’ 
(1994) Arch.N. 4; Law Com Consultation No.183, [A.1-3].    
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 See, for example, Consultation No.183, [A.1-3].  
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 Case Comment, n91.  
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Ulterior mens rea has been presented elsewhere as a ‘missing piece in a jigsaw puzzle’, 
lacking a clear definition and absent from codification.
94
 In this paper, not only have we 
attempted to construct this missing piece (through recognition of a new ulterior mens rea 
element), but we have also sought to demonstrate the importance of its role within the law, 
both conceptually and substantively. Although our focus within the paper shifts rapidly to 
substantive concerns in relation to inchoate liability, the prospect of conceptual coherence 
within the analysis of all offences including ulterior mens rea should not be overlooked. 
Located as they are at the very edges of the criminal net, it is contended that consistent and 
coherent models for analysis are more important here than in almost any other area. This is 
made possible through the new ulterior mens rea element.  
 
With regard to our substantive concerns, these relate to inchoate offences (that vary mens rea 
between principal offence elements) as they apply to principal offences containing 
requirements of ulterior mens rea. They are concerns exemplified within the confusion of AG 
Ref (No.3 of 1992), and made more compelling by their potential application within infinite 
inchoate liability. Of course, it is important to remember that the factors that have created 
these concerns are still relatively new to the law, and it is possible to console oneself with the 
scarcity of cases like AG Ref (No.3 of 1992) that combine them. However, with each of these 
factors expanding rapidly, it is contended that without specific attention, such concerns will 
only increase. This expansion applies to inchoate (and other) offences that vary mens rea 
between the elements of a principal offence;
95
 principal offences of all types that include 
ulterior mens rea requirements;
96
 and even the possibility of infinite inchoate liability.
97
 As 
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 Leader-Elliott, n4, 430.  
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 See, for example, Law Commission recommendations on conspiracy (Law Com No.318); complicity (Law 
Com No.305) and even the rules on intoxication (Law Com No.314). 
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 See n4.  
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discussed in Parts 2 and 3, the restriction of such liability to acceptable (and often assumed) 
limits is crucial if we are to accept this form of liability at all. Again, this is made possible 
through the new ulterior mens rea element. 
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 Most significantly, the Serious Crime Act 2007, s49 has expanded the combinations of infinite inchoate 
liability permitted within the old law (including attempt, conspiracy and incitement to incite and conspiracy and 
incitement to attempt) to include assisting, encouraging, conspiring and attempting to assist, assisting to 
encourage, assisting to attempt, and assisting or encouraging to conspire. The Commission also makes clear that 
they expect a greater use of infinite inchoate liability within the policing of serious crime (Law Com No.318, 
[3.9-3.10]); highlighting supportive research, Gallagher, Fraser, Christmann, Hodgson, International and 
internet child sexual abuse and exploitation: Research report (2006), 
http://webserver.hud.ac.uk/schools/hhs/research/acs/staff/Inter_net_CSA.pdf. 
